Re-Open 9/11 Investigation!!!

Here is a timeline of the farce that was the original 9/11 investigation…it comes from an open source coordinated project, therefore I feel pretty comfortable re-posting it here. Heavily sourced and referenced for your convenience…call or write your Congressman…America deserves better than THIS!!!

December 21, 2001: Senators Introduce Bills to Create Independent 9/11 Commission

Two bipartisan pairs of senators introduce legislation to create independent 9/11 commissions. Senators Joe Lieberman (D) and John McCain (R) propose to create a 14-member, bipartisan commission with subpoena power. At the same time, Robert Torricelli (D) and Charles Grassley (R) propose to create a 12-member board of inquiry with subpoena power. White House spokeswoman Anne Womack is noncommittal about the proposals, saying, “We look forward to reviewing them. Right now, the president is focused on fighting the war on terrorism.” [New York Times. 21 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 12/21/2001]

Entity Tags: John McCain, Charles Grassley, Joseph Lieberman, Robert Torricelli

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

January 24, 2002: Cheney and Bush Pressure Senator to Avoid 9/11 Inquiry

Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D) later claims that on this day, Vice President Cheney calls him and urges that no 9/11 inquiry be made. President Bush repeats the request on January 28, and Daschle is repeatedly pressured thereafter. Newsweek summarizes one of these conversations: “Bush administration officials might say they’re too busy running the war on terrorism to show up. Press the issue … and you risk being accused of interfering with the mission.” [Newsweek. 4 February.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 2/4/2002] Cheney later disagrees: “Tom’s wrong. He has, in this case, let’s say a misinterpretation.” [Reuters. 27 May.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Reuters, 5/27/2002]

Entity Tags: Richard (”Dick”) Cheney, Tom Daschle, George W. Bush

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

May 23, 2002: Bush Opposes Special Inquiry into Terrorism Warnings

President Bush says he is opposed to establishing a special, independent commission to probe how the government dealt with terrorism warnings before 9/11. [CBS News. 2002. “Bush Opposes 9/11 Query Panel.” 23 May.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CBS News, 5/23/2002] He later changes his stance in the face of overwhelming support for the idea (see September 20, 2002), and then sabotages an agreement that Congress had reached to establish the commission.

Entity Tags: Zahed Sheikh Mohammed, George W. Bush

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

Summer 2002-Summer 2004: 9/11 Investigations Glance over Intercepts of Hijackers’ Calls

Both the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission examine the NSA’s intercepts of various calls made by the hijackers to an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry refers to several of the calls and gives an idea of the content of some of them. But it does not mention those made by Nawaf Alhazmi and possibly other hijackers from the US after the USS Cole bombing, which are only disclosed later in the media (see Mid-October 2000-Summer 2001 and 2004 and After). However, this section of the Inquiry report is heavily redacted so most details remain unknown. It states that, although the NSA intercepted the calls and disseminated dispatches about some of them, the NSA did not realize the hijackers were in the US at the time the calls were made. [Report Of The Joint Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001. 108th Cong., 1st sess.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. xii, 11-12, 143-146, 155-157 ] The 9/11 Commission Report contains a briefer section on the intercepts and deals with those which led to the surveillance of the Malaysia meeting. In addition, it mentions that Almihdhar called his wife from San Diego in the spring of 2000, but fails to mention that his wife lived at an al-Qaeda communications hub and that the calls were intercepted by the NSA (see Spring-Summer 2000). [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 222] The Los Angeles Times comments: “The [9/11 Congressional Inquiry] and the Sept. 11 commission that came after it referred indirectly to the calls from Yemen to San Diego. But neither report discloses what the NSA gleaned from the calls, or why they were never disclosed to the FBI.” [Los Angeles Times. 21 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Los Angeles Times, 12/21/2005] The publication of the 9/11 Commission report and revelations about domestic surveillance by the NSA will lead to increased media interest in and revelations about the intercepts starting from 2004 (see 2004 and After).

Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Hoda al-Hada, Khalid Almihdhar, 9/11 Commission, Ahmed al-Hada, Nawaf Alhazmi, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

June 22, 2002: 9/11 Inquiry Member Appears Biased in Defending FBI

Internal FBI documents show that Thomas Kelley, in charge of matters relating to the FBI in the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, blocked an inquiry into the FBI’s role in Waco. For instance, an internal FBI memo from December 2000 states that Kelley “continued to thwart and obstruct” the Waco investigation to the point that a special counsel was forced to send a team to search FBI headquarters for documents Kelley refused to turn over. [Washington Post. 22 June.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 6/22/2002]

Entity Tags: Thomas Kelley, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

October 10, 2002: Bush Backtracks on Support for Independent 9/11 Investigation

A tentative congressional deal to create an independent commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks falls apart hours after the White House objected to the plan (it appears Vice President Cheney called Republican leaders and told them to renege on the agreement [New York Times. 2 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 11/2/2002] ). Bush had pledged to support such a commission a few weeks earlier (see September 20, 2002), but doubters who questioned his sincerity appear to have been proven correct. Hours after top Republican leaders announced at a press conference that an agreement had been reached, House Republican leaders said they wouldn’t bring the legislation to the full House for a vote unless the commission proposal was changed. There are worries that if the White House can delay the legislation for a few more days until Congress adjourns, it could stop the creation of a commission for months, if not permanently. [New York Times. 11 October.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 10/11/2002] Another deal is made a few weeks later (see November 15, 2002) and the commission goes forward.

Entity Tags: Richard (”Dick”) Cheney

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

October 17, 2002: Tenet Misinforms Congressional Inquiry about CIA Knowledge of Hijackers’ Entry into US

In sworn testimony to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, CIA Director George Tenet repeatedly claims that a March 2000 cable sent to CIA headquarters reporting that hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi had entered the US was not read by anybody. He says, “I know that nobody read that cable,” “Nobody read that cable in the March timeframe,” and “[N]obody read that information only cable.” [New York Times. 2002. “Testimony From the Joint Intelligence Committee.” 17 October.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 10/17/2002] Former Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black will also claim that the cable was not read. [Report Of The Joint Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001. 108th Cong., 1st sess.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 ] However, a later investigation by the CIA Office of Inspector General will find that numerous CIA officers had actually read the cable shortly after it was sent (see ). Nevertheless, the 9/11 Commission will later assert that, “No-one outside the Counterterrorist Center was told any of this” (about Alhazmi’s arrival in the US) and neglect to mention that Tenet had previously misstated the CIA’s knowledge of the hijackers. Neither will the 9/11 Commission investigate the cause of the CIA’s apparent inaction. [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181]

Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Cofer Black, 9/11 Commission, Nawaf Alhazmi

Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

November 15, 2002: Congress Starts New 9/11 Investigation

Congress approves legislation creating an independent commission—the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—to “examine and report on the facts and causes relating to the September 11th terrorist attacks” and “make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks.” President Bush signs it into law November 27, 2002. [Establishing the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, Public Law 107-306. 107th Cong., 2nd sess.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US Congress, 11/27/2002] Bush originally opposed an independent commission (see May 23, 2002), but he changes his mind over the summer (see September 20, 2002) after political pressure. The Democrats concede several important aspects of the commission (such as subpoena approval) after the White House threatens to create a commission by executive order, over which it would have more control. Bush will appoint the commission chairman and he sets a strict time frame (18 months) for the investigation. [CNN. 15 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 11/15/2002] The commission will only have a $3 million budget. Senator Jon Corzine (D) and others wonder how the commission can accomplish much with such a small budget. [Associated Press. 20 January.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 1/20/2003] The budget is later increased (see March 26, 2003).

Entity Tags: Jon Corzine, George W. Bush, US Congress, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

November 27, 2002: Kissinger Named Chairman of New 9/11 Commission

Henry Kissinger. [Source: Public domain]President Bush names Henry Kissinger as Chairman of the 9/11 Commission. Congressional Democrats appoint George Mitchell, former Senate majority leader and peace envoy to Northern Ireland and the Middle East, as vice chairman. Their replacements and the other eight members of the commission are chosen by mid-December. Kissinger served as Secretary of State and National Security Adviser for Presidents Nixon and Ford. [New York Times. 2002. “The Kissinger Commission.” 29 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 11/29/2002] Kissinger’s ability to remain independent is met with skepticism. [Sydney Morning Herald. 29 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Sydney Morning Herald, 11/29/2002; CNN. 2002. “Mark Shields: The strange choice of Henry Kissinger.” 30 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 11/30/2002; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 3 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/3/2002; Washington Post. 17 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 12/17/2002] He has a very controversial past. For instance, “Documents recently released by the CIA, strengthen previously-held suspicions that Kissinger was actively involved in the establishment of Operation Condor, a covert plan involving six Latin American countries including Chile, to assassinate thousands of political opponents.” He is also famous for an “obsession with secrecy.” [BBC. 2002. “Henry Kissinger: Haunted by His Past.” 26 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">BBC, 4/26/2002] It is even difficult for Kissinger to travel outside the US. Investigative judges in Spain, France, Chile, and Argentina seek to question him in several legal actions related to his possible involvement in war crimes, particularly in Latin America, Vietnam, Cambodia (see March 1969-1973), Laos (see 1969-1973), Bangladesh, Chile, and East Timor (see December 7, 1976). [Village Voice. 15 August.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Village Voice, 8/15/2001; BBC. 18 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">BBC, 4/18/2002; Chicago Tribune. 1 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Chicago Tribune, 12/1/2002] The New York Times suggests, “Indeed, it is tempting to wonder if the choice of Mr. Kissinger is not a clever maneuver by the White House to contain an investigation it long opposed.” [New York Times. 2002. “The Kissinger Commission.” 29 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 11/29/2002] The Chicago Tribune notes that “the president who appointed him originally opposed this whole undertaking.” Kissinger is “known more for keeping secrets from the American people than for telling the truth” and asking him “to deliver a critique that may ruin friends and associates is asking a great deal.” [Chicago Tribune. 2002. “The Kissinger Commission.” 5 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Chicago Tribune, 12/5/2002]

Entity Tags: George Mitchell, 9/11 Commission, Henry A. Kissinger, George W. Bush

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

December 11, 2002: Mitchell Resigns from New 9/11 Commission

George Mitchell. [Source: Public domain]George Mitchell resigns as vice chairman of the recently-created 9/11 investigative commission. Lee Hamilton, an Indiana congressman for more than 30 years and chairman of the committee which investigated the Iran-Contra affair, is named as his replacement. [CNN. 11 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 12/11/2002] Mitchell cites time constraints as his reason for stepping down, but he also does not want to sever ties with his lawyer-lobbying firm, Piper Rudnick, or reveal his list of clients. Recent clients include the governments of Yemen and the United Arab Emirates. [Newsweek. 15 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 12/15/2002]

Entity Tags: Lee Hamilton, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, 9/11 Commission, George Mitchell

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

December 13, 2002: Kissinger Resigns from New 9/11 Commission

Henry Kissinger resigns as head of the new 9/11 Commission. [Associated Press. 13 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 12/13/2002; Associated Press. 13 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 12/13/2002] Two days earlier, the Bush administration argued that Kissinger was not required to disclose his private business clients. [New York Times. 12 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 12/12/2002] However, the Congressional Research Service insists that he does, and Kissinger resigns rather than reveal his clients. [MSNBC. 13 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 12/13/2002; Seattle Times. 14 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Seattle Times, 12/14/2002] It is reported that Kissinger is (or has been) a consultant for Unocal, the oil corporation, and was involved in plans to build pipelines through Afghanistan (see September-October 1995). [Washington Post. 5 October.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 10/5/1998; Salon. 3 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Salon, 12/3/2002] Kissinger claims he did no current work for any oil companies or Mideast clients, but several corporations with heavy investments in Saudi Arabia, such as ABB Group, a Swiss-Swedish engineering firm, and Boeing Corp., pay him consulting fees of at least $250,000 a year. A Boeing spokesman said its “long-standing” relationship with Kissinger involved advice on deals in East Asia, not Saudi Arabia. Boeing sold $7.2 billion worth of aircraft to Saudi Arabia in 1995. [Newsweek. 15 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 12/15/2002] In a surprising break from usual procedures regarding high-profile presidential appointments, White House lawyers never vetted Kissinger for conflicts of interest. [Newsweek. 15 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 12/15/2002] The Washington Post says that after the resignations of Kissinger and Mitchell, the commission “has lost time” and “is in disarray, which is no small trick given that it has yet to meet.” [Washington Post. 2002. “False Start on 9/11.” 14 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 12/14/2002]

Entity Tags: Henry A. Kissinger, Congressional Research Service, Bush administration, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

December 16, 2002: Ex-Governor Kean replaces Kissinger as Chairman of New 9/11 Commission

Thomas Kean. [Source: Public domain]President Bush names former New Jersey governor Thomas Kean as the Chairman of the 9/11 Commission after his original choice, Henry Kissinger, resigned (see December 13, 2002). [Washington Post. 17 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 12/17/2002] In an appearance on NBC, Kean promises an aggressive investigation. “It’s really a remarkably broad mandate, so I don’t think we’ll have any problem looking under every rock. I’ve got no problems in going as far as we have to in finding out the facts.” [Associated Press. 17 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 12/17/2002] However, Kean plans to remain president of Drew University and devote only one day a week to the commission. He also claims he would have no conflicts of interest, stating: “I have no clients except the university.” [Washington Post. 17 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 12/17/2002] However, he has a history of such conflicts of interest. Multinational Monitor has previously stated: “Perhaps no individual more clearly illustrates the dangers of university presidents maintaining corporate ties than Thomas Kean,” citing the fact that he is on the Board of Directors of Aramark (which received a large contract with his university after he became president), Bell Atlantic, United Health Care, Beneficial Corporation, Fiduciary Trust Company International, and others. [Multinational Monitor. November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Multinational Monitor, 11/1997]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Thomas Kean, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

Mid-December 2002-March 2003: 9/11 Commission Gets Off to Slow Start

After experiencing some problems at its inception due to the resignation of its chair and vice-chair (see December 11, 2002 and December 13, 2002), the 9/11 Commission spends much of the next four months hiring staff, getting security clearances (see March 27, 2003), finding office space, and asking for a budget increase (see March 26, 2003). One of the first employees hired is executive director Philip Zelikow, but disputes within the Commission over who will be general council last until March, when Dan Marcus is hired. The Commission is unable to even have a telephone until February, when it finds an official security facility for its offices. However, then most of the Commission’s staff cannot enter their offices, because they do not have the relevant security clearances yet, even though there are no secret documents actually in the offices at this point. [Without Precedent. New York: Knopf.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 34-45]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, Dan Marcus

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commission Starts Off with Little Funding

The 9/11 Commission, officially titled the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, holds its first meeting in Washington. The commission has $3 million and only a year and a half to explore the causes of the attacks. By comparison, a 1996 federal commission to study legalized gambling was given two years and $5 million. [Associated Press. 2003. “9/11 Commission Meets Behind Closed Doors.” 27 January.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 1/27/2003] Two months later the Bush administration grudgingly increases the funding to $12 million total (see March 26, 2003). Philip Zelikow, the director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and formerly in the National Security Council during George H. W. Bush’s administration, is also appointed executive director of the commission. [Associated Press. 2003. “9/11 Commission Meets Behind Closed Doors.” 27 January.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 1/27/2003] Zelikow cowrote a book with National Security Adviser Rice and was also, in 2002, responsible for completely rewriting President Bush’s national security strategy. [9/11 Commission, 3/2003; Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush\'s War Cabinet. New York: Penguin.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Mann, 2004, pp. 316-317] A few days later, Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton says, “The focus of the commission will be on the future. We want to make recommendations that will make the American people more secure. … We’re not interested in trying to assess blame, we do not consider that part of the commission’s responsibility.” [United Press International. 6 February.')" onmouseout="return nd()">United Press International, 2/6/2003]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Bush administration, Lee Hamilton, Philip Zelikow

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

March 26, 2003: Bush Turns Down Increased Budget for 9/11 Commission

Time reports that the 9/11 Commission has requested an additional $11 million to add to the $3 million for the commission, and the Bush administration has turned down the request. The request will not be added to a supplemental spending bill. A Republican member of the commission says the decision will make it “look like they have something to hide.” Another commissioner notes that the recent commission on the Columbia shuttle crash will have a $50 million budget. Stephen Push, a leader of the 9/11 victims’ families, says the decision “suggests to me that they see this as a convenient way for allowing the commission to fail. they’ve never wanted the commission and I feel the White House has always been looking for a way to kill it without having their finger on the murder weapon.” The administration has suggested it may grant the money later, but any delay will further slow down the commission’s work. Already, commission members are complaining that scant progress has been made in the four months since the commission started, and they are operating under a deadline. [Time. 26 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Time, 3/26/2003] Three days later, it is reported that the Bush administration has agreed to extra funding, but only $9 million, not $11 million. The commission agrees to the reduced amount. [Washington Post. 29 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 3/29/2003] The New York Times criticizes such penny-pinching, saying, “Reasonable people might wonder if the White House, having failed in its initial attempt to have Henry Kissinger steer the investigation, may be resorting to budgetary starvation as a tactic to hobble any politically fearless inquiry.” [New York Times. 31 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 3/31/2003]

Entity Tags: Stephen Push, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

March 27, 2003: Security Clearance of 9/11 Commission Members Stalled

It is reported that “most members” of the 9/11 Commission still have not received security clearances. [Washington Post. 27 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 3/27/2003] For instance, Slade Gorton, picked in December 2002, is a former senator with a long background in intelligence issues. Fellow commissioner Lee Hamilton says, “It’s kind of astounding that someone like Senator Gorton can’t get immediate clearance. It’s a matter we are concerned about.” The commission is said to be at a “standstill” because of the security clearance issue, and cannot even read the classified findings of the previous 9/11 Congressional Inquiry. [Seattle Times. 12 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Seattle Times, 3/12/2003]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Slade Gorton, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

March 28, 2003: Independence of 9/11 Commission Called Into Question

An article highlights conflicts of interest amongst the commissioners on the 9/11 Commission. It had been previously reported that many of the commissioners had ties to the airline industry (see December 16, 2002), but a number have other ties. “At least three of the ten commissioners serve as directors of international financial or consulting firms, five work for law firms that represent airlines and three have ties to the US military or defense contractors, according to personal financial disclosures they were required to submit.” Bryan Doyle, project manager for the watchdog group Aviation Integrity Project says, “It is simply a failure on the part of the people making the selections to consider the talented pool of non-conflicted individuals.” Commission chairman Thomas Kean says that members are expected to steer clear of discussions that might present even the appearance of a conflict. [Associated Press. 28 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 3/28/2003]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, Bryan Doyle

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

March 31, 2003: US Government Draws Harsh Criticism at First 9/11 Commission Hearing

Mindy Kleinberg. [Source: Public domain]The 9/11 Commission has its first public hearing. The Miami Herald reports, “Several survivors of the attack and victims’ relatives testified that a number of agencies, from federal to local, are ducking responsibility for a series of breakdowns before and during September 11.” [Miami Herald. 31 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Miami Herald, 3/31/2003] The New York Times suggests that the 9/11 Commission would never have been formed if it were not for the pressure of the 9/11 victims’ relatives. [New York Times. 1 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 4/1/2003] Some of the relatives strongly disagreed with statements from some commissioners that they would not place blame. For instance, Stephen Push states, “I think this commission should point fingers. … Some of those people [who failed us] are still in responsible positions in government. Perhaps they shouldn’t be.” [United Press International. 31 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">United Press International, 3/31/2003] The most critical testimony comes from 9/11 relative Mindy Kleinberg, but her testimony is only briefly reported on by a few newspapers. [United Press International. 31 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">United Press International, 3/31/2003; Newsday. 1 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsday, 4/1/2003; New York Times. 1 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 4/1/2003; New York Post. 1 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Post, 4/1/2003; New Jersey Star-Ledger. 1 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New Jersey Star-Ledger, 4/1/2003] In her testimony, Kleinberg says, “It has been said that the intelligence agencies have to be right 100 percent of the time and the terrorists only have to get lucky once. This explanation for the devastating attacks of September 11th, simple on its face, is wrong in its value. Because the 9/11 terrorists were not just lucky once: They were lucky over and over again.” She points out the insider trading based on 9/11 foreknowledge, the failure of fighters to catch the hijacked planes in time, hijackers getting visas in violation of standard procedures, and other events, and asks how the hijackers could have been lucky so many times. [Statement of Mindy Kleinberg.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 3/31/2003]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Mindy Kleinberg, Stephen Push

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

March 31-July 9, 2003 and After: 9/11 Commission Initially Conducts Little Noticed Background Policy Hearings

The 9/11 Commission holds its first three hearings in the spring and summer of 2003 on topics such as the experience of the attack, congressional oversight, and whether Iraq was behind 9/11 (see March 31, 2003). [Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 4/1/2003; Public Hearing: September 11, 2001: The Attacks And The Response and Reforming Civil Aviation Security: Next Steps.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003; Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/9/2003 ] These hearings do not receive much publicity and Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice-chairman Lee Hamilton will later call them “background policy hearings in front of a C-SPAN audience.” The victims’ families are frustrated by this, by the lack of tough questioning, and by the fact that witnesses are not placed under oath. Kean and Hamilton later say that at this point the Commission “was not ready to present findings and answers” since the various staff teams are nowhere near completing their tasks. For example, the team investigating the air defense failure on the day of 9/11 does not even issue a subpoena for the documents it needs until autumn (see Late October 2003 and October-November 2003). [Without Precedent. New York: Knopf.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 127-8]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, Lee Hamilton

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

April 24, 2003: 9/11 Commission Member Barred from Viewing Intelligence Material

9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer tries to review the transcripts of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry. However, he learns that he has no permission to see them, even though he served on the Inquiry and had read the material before. [Associated Press. 2003. “Panel\'s Lack Of Access to 9/11 Papers Is Decried.” 26 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 4/26/2003] Roemer says the arrangement is outrageous: “No entity, individual, or organization should sift through or filter our access to material.” [Associated Press. 30 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 4/30/2003]

Entity Tags: Tim Roemer, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

July 8, 2003: 9/11 Commission Denounces Lack of Cooperation

A status report released by the 9/11 Commission shows that various government agencies are not cooperating fully with the investigation. Neither the CIA nor the Justice Department have provided all requested documents. Lack of cooperation on the part of the Department of Defense “[is] becoming particularly serious,” and the commission has received no responses whatsoever to requests related to national air defenses. The FBI, State Department, and Transportation Department receive generally positive reviews. [Associated Press. 9 July.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 7/9/2003] Commissioner Tim Roemer complains, “We’re not getting the kind of cooperation that we should be. We need a steady stream of information coming to us … Instead, We’re getting a trickle.” [Guardian. 10 July.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Guardian, 7/10/2003] Chairman Thomas Kean is also troubled by the Bush administration’s insistence on having a Justice Department official present during interviews with federal officials. [Associated Press. 9 July.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 7/9/2003] The 9/11 Commission is eventually forced to subpoena documents from the Defense Department and FAA (see October-November 2003).

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice, US Department of Defense, Tim Roemer, Thomas Kean, Bush administration, US Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Transportation

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

October-November 2003: 9/11 Commission Subpoenas FAA and Pentagon for Missing Documents

The 9/11 Commission unanimously agrees to subpoena the FAA after it refuses to produce records relating to FAA notification to US air defenses concerning the hijacked planes on 9/11. The panel states, “This disturbing development at one agency has led the commission to reexamine its general policy of relying on document requests rather than subpoenas.” [Associated Press. 15 October.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 10/15/2003] The commission also votes to subpoena the Pentagon for documents related to NORAD’s fighter response on 9/11. The commission says it is “especially dismayed” by incomplete document production on the part of NORAD. The commission explains, “In several cases we were assured that all requested records had been produced, but we then discovered, through investigation, that these assurances were mistaken.” [Associated Press. 7 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 11/7/2003]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, US Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, North American Aerospace Defense Command

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

Late October 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Tour of NEADS Facility Suspended Over Discrepancies

Several months into its investigation, the 9/11 Commission is already dissatisfied with the Department of Defense (see July 8, 2003). When its staff take a tour of a Northeast Air Defense Sector facility in Rome, New York, which helped coordinate the air defense on the day of 9/11, the staff enter the operations room, which has “more than twenty banks of operators: some weapons controllers and some flight controllers.” The staff find that the operators’ conversations are always tape-recorded, but the tapes for 9/11 have not yet been sent to the commission and, according to Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice-Chairman Lee Hamilton, “there were also discrepancies between things NORAD was telling [the commission] about their performance on the morning of September—things that the agency had stated publicly after 9/11—and the story told by the limited tapes and documents the commission had received.” Upon learning of the existence of the tapes, team leader John Farmer immediately suspends the tour and the interviews and flies to meet Kean in New Jersey. The commission subsequently subpoenas NORAD for the tapes (see October-November 2003), but, according to Kean and Hamilton, this means that “the staff had lost so much time that our hearing on the 9/11 story in the skies was postponed for months. Indeed, the delays from NORAD and the FAA made it highly unlikely that the team could complete its work as scheduled.” [Without Precedent. New York: Knopf.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 85-88] Chapter 1 of the commission’s final report will draw heavily on the tapes. [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 1-46] However, the commission does not make the same effort with all day of 9/11 recordings. For example, it does not even find out which person(s) from the Department of Defense participated in a White House video conference chaired by counter-terrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke during the attacks. [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 36]

Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Lee Hamilton, Northeast Air Defense Sector, John Farmer, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

October 21, 2003: 9/11 Commission Staff Meet Member of Able Danger Unit

Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, along with two members of the commission’s staff and an unnamed “representative of the executive branch,” meets at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan with three individuals doing intelligence work for the US Defense Department. [CNN. 2005. “Officer: 9/11 Panel Didn\'t Receive Key Information.” 17 August.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 8/17/2005; Sacramento Bee. 24 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Sacramento Bee, 11/24/2005] Among these is Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, an Army intelligence officer who worked closely with a military intelligence unit called Able Danger, which between fall 1999 and spring 2001 was tasked with assembling information about al-Qaeda networks around the world (see Fall 1999 and January-March 2001). According to Shaffer’s own later account, he gives the commission staff a detailed account of what Able Danger was, and tells them, “We found two of the three cells which conducted 9/11, to include [Mohamed] Atta.” At the end of the meeting, Philip Zelikow approaches him and says, “This is important. We need to continue this dialogue when we get back to the states.” [Government Security News. September.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Government Security News, 9/2005] Following the meeting, Zelikow calls back to the 9/11 Commission’s headquarters in Washington to request that staff draft a document request, seeking information on Able Danger from the Department of Defense. [Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 ] According to Anthony Shaffer, “My understanding from talking to another member of the press is that [Zelikow’s] call came into America at four o clock in the morning. He got people out of bed over this.” [Government Security News. September.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Government Security News, 9/2005] Shaffer subsequently tries contacting Philip Zelikow in January 2004 (see Early January 2004). After it is revealed in the press that the commission, which includes no mention of Able Danger in its final report, had been briefed on the unit, spokesmen for commission members will insist that while they were informed of Able Danger at this time, they were not informed that it had identified Mohamed Atta or any other hijackers as threats. [New York Times. 10 August.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 8/10/2005] Head commissioners Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton will later say in an official statement that a memorandum prepared by the commission staff after the meeting “does not record any mention of Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers, or any suggestion that their identities were known to anyone at DOD before 9/11. Nor do any of the three Commission staffers who participated in the interview, or the executive branch lawyer, recall hearing any such allegation.” [Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 ]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Able Danger, Philip Zelikow, Mohamed Atta, Anthony Shaffer, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: Able Danger, 9/11 Commission, Able Danger, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

November 12, 2003: 9/11 Commission and White House Agree to Terms of Access

Senators of both parties have been accusing the White House of stonewalling the 9/11 Commission by blocking its demands for documents despite threats of a subpoena. [Associated Press. 2003. “White House Is Said to Ignore 9/11 Panel.” 27 October.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 10/27/2003] On this day, the White House and the 9/11 Commission strike a deal. The main issue is access to the presidential daily briefings given to President Bush. Under the deal, only some of the ten commissioners will be allowed to examine classified intelligence documents, and their notes will be subject to White House review. Some 9/11 victims’ relatives complain that the agreement gives the White House too much power. The Family Steering Committee complains, “All ten commissioners should have full, unfettered, and unrestricted access to all evidence.” It urges the public release of “the full, official, and final written agreement.” [Associated Press. 13 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 11/13/2003] Commissioner Max Cleland is unsatisfied with the deal and resigns a short time later (see December 9, 2003).

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, George W. Bush, Bush administration

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

December 9, 2003: Bob Kerry Replaces Max Cleland on 9/11 Commission

Bob Kerrey, the former Nebraska senator who also served as the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, is appointed to the 9/11 Commission, replacing Max Cleland, who leaves the commission to accept a position on the board of the Export-Import Bank. [Washington Post. 10 December.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 12/10/2003] Just before resigning, Cleland called the Bush administration’s attempts to stonewall and “slow walk” the commission a “national scandal.” He criticized the commission for cutting a deal with the White House that compromised their access to information, and said, “I’m not going to be part of looking at information only partially. I’m not going to be part of just coming to quick conclusions. I’m not going to be part of political pressure to do this or not do that. I’m not going to be part of that. This is serious.” [Salon. 21 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Salon, 11/21/2003]

Entity Tags: Export-Import Bank, Bush administration, Bob Kerrey, 9/11 Commission, Max Cleland

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

January-March 22, 2004: National Security Adviser Rice Privately Regrets Comments, Then Publicly Repeats Them

The New York Times later reports that in private discussions with the 9/11 Commission in January 2002, National Security Adviser “Rice [is] asked about statements she made in 2001 and 2002 [(see May 16, 2002)] that ‘we could not have imagined’ that terrorists would use aircraft as weapons by piloting them into buildings. She [tells] the commission that she regret[s] those comments, because at the time she was not aware of intelligence, developed in the late 1990s, that some terrorists were thinking of using airplanes as guided missiles. She told the commission in the private session that she should have said, ‘I could not have imagined,’ according to one official familiar with the testimony, making it clear that some in the intelligence community knew about those threats but that she did not.” [New York Times. 6 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 4/6/2004] However, in a March 22, 2004 op-ed for the Washington Post entitled “For the Record,” she essentially repeats her 2002 comments, claiming, “Despite what some have suggested, we received no intelligence that terrorists were preparing to attack the homeland using airplanes as missiles, though some analysts speculated that terrorists might hijack airplanes to try to free US-held terrorists.” [Washington Post. 22 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 3/22/2004]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Condoleezza Rice

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

Early 2004: Weldon Fails to Convince 9/11 Commission to Look into Data Mining Programs

Rep. Curt Weldon. [Source: House of Representatives]Rep. Curt Weldon (R) is not yet familiar with Able Danger, though he will help bring information about the program to light in 2005. However, he is familiar with the closely related Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) program, having had dealings with it before 9/11. He says he is frustrated at the apparent lack of understanding about programs like LIWA based on the lines of questioning at public 9/11 Commission hearings in early 2004, so, “On at least four occasions, I personally tried to brief the 9/11 Commissioners on: NOAH [Weldon’s pre-9/11 suggestion to have a National Operations and Analysis Hub]; integrative data collaboration capabilities; my frustration with intelligence stovepipes; and al-Qaeda analysis. However, I was never able to achieve more than a five-minute telephone conversation with Commissioner Thomas Kean. On March 24, 2004, I also had my Chief of Staff personally hand deliver a document about LIWA, along [with] questions for George Tenet to the Commission, but neither was ever used.” [US Congress. Senate. Committee on Judiciary, 9/21/2005] He says, “The next week, they sent a staffer over to pick up some additional materials about the NIWA, about the concept, and about information I had briefed them on. They never followed up and invited me to come in and meet with them. So they can’t say that I didn’t try.” [Office of Congressman Curt Weldon, 9/17/2005]

Entity Tags: Curt Weldon, Land Information Warfare Activity, 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, George J. Tenet

Category Tags: Able Danger, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations

Early January 2004: Able Danger Intelligence Officer Tries Contacting 9/11 Commission

Following an October 2003 meeting with three members of the 9/11 Commission’s staff (see October 21, 2003), Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer tries contacting Philip Zelikow, the commission’s executive director, as requested by Zelikow himself. Shaffer is an Army intelligence officer who worked closely with a military intelligence unit called Able Danger, which identified Mohamed Atta and three other future 9/11 hijackers in early 2000 (see January-February 2000). He phones Zelikow’s number the first week of January 2004. The person who replies tells him, “I will talk to Dr. Zelikow and find out when he wants you to come in.” However, Shaffer receives no call back, so a week later he phones again. This time, the person who answers him says, “Dr. Zelikow tells me that he does not see the need for you to come in. We have all the information on Able Danger.” [Government Security News. September.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Government Security News, 9/2005] Yet the commission doesn’t even receive the Able Danger documentation they had previously requested from the Defense Department until the following month (see February 2004). [Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 ]

Entity Tags: Able Danger, Philip Zelikow, Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission, Anthony Shaffer

Category Tags: Able Danger, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations

January 19, 2004: White House Opposes 9/11 Commission Extension

The Washington Post reports, “A growing number of [9/11 Commission] members [have] concluded that the panel needs more time to prepare a thorough and credible accounting of missteps leading to the terrorist attacks.” As a result, the commission is asking Congress to vote on approving a several month extension to finish their report. “But the White House and leading Republicans have informed the panel that they oppose any delay, which raises the possibility that Sept. 11-related controversies could emerge during the heat of the presidential campaign.” [Washington Post. 19 January.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 1/19/2004] The White House will reverse its stance a month later (see February 5, 2004).

Entity Tags: White House, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

February-April 2004: Bush Administration Withholds Clinton Documents from 9/11 Commission

The Bush administration withholds thousands of documents from the Clinton administration that had already been cleared by Clinton’s general counsel Bruce Lindsey for release to the 9/11 Commission. [New York Times. 2 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 4/2/2004] In April, after a public outcry, the Bush administration grants access to most of the documents. [Washington Post. 3 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 4/3/2004; Fox News. 2004. “Sept. 11 Panel to Decide Fate of Clinton Counterterror Papers.” 4 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Fox News, 4/4/2004] However, they continue to withhold approximately 57 documents. According to the commission, the documents being withheld by the Bush White House include references to al-Qaeda, bin Laden, and other issues relevant to the panel’s work. [Washington Post. 8 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 4/8/2004]

Entity Tags: Bruce Lindsey, Clinton administration, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

February 2004: 9/11 Commission Receives Documentation Relating to Able Danger Program

The 9/11 Commission receives documents that it had requested from the Department of Defense, relating to a military intelligence unit called Able Danger, which had allegedly identified Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers more than a year before the attacks. [New York Times. 9 August.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 8/9/2005; Times Herald (Norristown). 13 August.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Times Herald (Norristown), 8/13/2005] The commission requested the documents in November 2003, after a meeting in Afghanistan with Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, an Army intelligence officer who had worked closely with the unit (see October 21, 2003). Some documents are given directly to the commission, others are available for review in a Department of Defense reading room, where commission staff make notes summarizing them. Some of the documents include diagrams of Islamic militant networks. However, an official statement later claims, “None of the documents turned over to the Commission mention Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers. Nor do any of the staff notes on documents reviewed in the DOD reading room indicate that Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers were mentioned in any of those documents.” [Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 ; Washington Post. 13 August.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 8/13/2005] Shaffer responds, “I’m told confidently by the person who moved the material over, that the Sept. 11 commission received two briefcase-sized containers of documents. I can tell you for a fact that would not be one-twentieth of the information that Able Danger consisted of during the time we spent.” [Fox News. 2005. “Agent Defends Military Unit\'s Data on 9/11 Hijackers.” 17 August.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Fox News, 8/17/2005]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, US Department of Defense, Anthony Shaffer, Able Danger

Category Tags: Able Danger, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations

February 5, 2004: White House Reverses Position and Backs 9/11 Commission Extension

In January 2004, the White House announced that it opposed giving the 9/11 Commission more time to complete its work (see January 19, 2004). But on this day, CNN reports, “After resisting the idea for months, the White House announced … its support for a request from the commission investigating the September 11, 2001 attacks for more time to complete its work.” 9/11 victims’ relatives and some politicians had been pressuring the White House to support the deadline extension. [CNN. 5 February.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 2/5/2004]

Entity Tags: White House, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

February 9, 2004: Full 9/11 Commission Allowed To View Summaries of Presidential Briefings

The 9/11 Commission gets greater access to classified intelligence briefings under a new agreement with the White House. The 10-member panel had been barred from reviewing notes concerning the presidential daily briefings taken by three of its own commissioners and the commission’s director in December 2003. The new agreement allows all commission members the opportunity to read White House-edited versions of the summaries. The White House had faced criticisms for allowing only some commissioners to see the notes. Still, only three commissioners are allowed to see the original, unclassified documents. [Associated Press. 10 February.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 2/10/2004]

Entity Tags: Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

February 11, 2004: Hijackers Said to Use Short Knives, Not Box Cutters

It is reported the 9/11 Commission now believes that the hijackers used short knives instead of box cutters. The New York Observer comments, “Remember the airlines’ first reports, that the whole job was pulled off with box cutters? In fact, investigators for the commission found that box cutters were reported on only one plane [Flight 77]. In any case, box cutters were considered straight razors and were always illegal. Thus the airlines switched their story and produced a snap-open knife of less than four inches at the hearing. This weapon falls conveniently within the aviation-security guidelines pre-9/11.” [New York Observer. 11 February.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Observer, 2/11/2004] It was publicly revealed in late 2002 that box cutters were illegal on 9/11. [Associated Press. 11 November.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 11/11/2002]

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

February 11, 2004: FBI Whisteblower Tells 9/11 Commission that Wiretapped Conversionations Pertaining to the Attacks Were Not Translated

Sibel Edmonds testifies before the 9/11 Commission in a specially constructed “bug-proof” secure room for three and a half hours, describing in detail problems she witnessed while working as an FBI linguist (see, e.g., September 20, 2001 and After, (After September 14, 2001-October 2001), Early October 2001, (Late October 2001), (November 2001), and December 2, 2001). A month later, she tells the Independent: “I gave [the commission] details of specific investigation files, the specific dates, specific target information, specific managers in charge of the investigation. I gave them everything so that they could go back and follow up. This is not hearsay. These are things that are documented. These things can be established very easily. … There was general information about the time-frame, about methods to be used but not specifically about how they would be used and about people being in place and who was ordering these sorts of terror attacks. There were other cities that were mentioned. Major cities with skyscrapers (see April 2001).” [Independent. 2 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Independent, 4/2/2004] In its final report (see July 22, 2004), the 9/11 Commission will make no mention of the problems Edmonds witnessed with the FBI’s translation unit, save for a single footnote. [Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 222; Edmonds, 8/1/2004] One month earlier, a reporter had asked one of the Democratic commissioners about the Edmonds case, and he replied, “It sounds like it’s too deep in the weeds for us to consider, we’re looking at broader issues.” [New York Observer. 22 January.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Observer, 1/22/2004]

Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission, Sibel Edmonds, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

March 21, 2004: Victims’ Relatives Demand That 9/11 Commission Executive Director Resign

Philip Zelikow. [Source: Miller Center]The 9-11 Family Steering Committee and 9-11 Citizens Watch demand the resignation of Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission. The demand comes shortly after former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke told the New York Times that Zelikow was present when he gave briefings on the threat posed by al-Qaeda to National Security Adviser Rice from December 2000 to January 2001. The Family Steering Committee, a group of 9/11 victims’ relatives, writes, “It is clear that [Zelikow] should never have been permitted to be a member of the commission, since it is the mandate of the commission to identify the source of failures. It is now apparent why there has been so little effort to assign individual culpability. We now can see that trail would lead directly to the staff director himself.” Zelikow has been interviewed by his own commission because of his role during the transition period. But a spokesman for the commission claims that having Zelikow recluse himself from certain topics is enough to avoid any conflicts of interest. [New York Times. 20 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 3/20/2004; United Press International. 23 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">United Press International, 3/23/2004] 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean defends Zelikow, calling him “one of the best experts on terrorism in the whole area of intelligence in the entire country” and “the best possible person we could have found for the job.” [NBC Meet the Press. 4 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">NBC, 4/4/2004] However, Salon points out that the “long list” of Zelikow’s writings “includes only one article focused on terrorism,” and he appears to have written nothing about al-Qaeda. [Salon. 6 April.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Salon, 4/6/2004]

Entity Tags: al-Qaeda, 9-11 Citizens Watch, Philip Zelikow, Condoleezza Rice, Richard A. Clarke, 9-11 Family Steering Committee, Thomas Kean, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

March 21, 2004: Counterterrorism Tsar Clarke Goes Public with Complaints Against Bush Response to Terrorism

Richard Clarke, counterterrorism “tsar” from 1998 until October 2001, ignites a public debate by accusing Bush of doing a poor job fighting al-Qaeda before 9/11. In a prominent 60 Minutes interview, he says, “I find it outrageous that the president is running for re-election on the grounds that he’s done such great things about terrorism. He ignored it. He ignored terrorism for months, when maybe we could have done something to stop 9/11. … I think he’s done a terrible job on the war against terrorism.” He adds, “We had a terrorist organization that was going after us! Al-Qaeda. That should have been the first item on the agenda. And it was pushed back and back and back for months.” He complains that he was Bush’s chief adviser on terrorism, yet he never got to brief Bush on the subject until after 9/11. [CBS News. 2004. “Did Bush Press For Iraq-9/11 Link?”. 21 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CBS News, 3/21/2004; CBS News. 2004. “Clarke\'s Take On Terror.” 21 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CBS News, 3/21/2004; Guardian. 23 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Guardian, 3/23/2004; Salon. 24 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Salon, 3/24/2004] The next day, his book Against All Enemies is released and becomes a best seller. [Washington Post. 22 March.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 3/22/2004] He testifies before the 9/11 Commission a few days later (see March 24, 2004).

Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, George W. Bush, al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission

Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission

March 24, 2004: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Gives High-Profile Testimony

Richard Clarke sworn in before the 9/11 Commission. [Source: CBC]Just a few days after releasing a new book, former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke testifies before the 9/11 Commission. His opening statement consists of little more than an apology to the relatives of the 9/11 victims. He says, “Your government failed you, those entrusted with protecting you failed you, and I failed you. For that failure, I would ask … for your understanding and forgiveness.” Und